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ABSTRACT
Since 1996 German local public transport by road has been organised as a hybrid regime
which allows for prioritised market-initiated services as well as contracted public services
initiated by competent authorities. In 2012 the legal framework was amended, but the
general setting of a hybrid regime was kept as well as the priority of commercial market
initiatives. The new law came into force in 2013. It was expected that conflicting initiatives
would possibly concern regional services, but not city networks due to the typically high level
of subsidies. Surprisingly, in 2015 a market initiative competed successfully against the
authority’s intention to tender the contract for the urban bus network in Pforzheim. As of
December 2016 a daughter company of Deutsche Bahn operates these services without any
contractual compensation (‘commercially’). The company formerly operating the services in
Pforzheim had to be shut down. The paper gives an overview of the regulation of the
German local public transport by road and describes the procedure through which
commercial operators may gain access to the market. It provides a closer look at the
Pforzheim case and concludes with an outlook on the (political) consequences of the case.
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1. Introduction
Since entering into force on 3 December 2009 Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 (“Regulation
1370/2007”) sets the rules in terms of state aid law and market access for public passenger
transport services by rail and by road. It took Germany several years to amend the legal
framework for bus and local transport on rails1 according to the requirements of Regulation
1370/2007 (Karl 2013). The new legal framework entered into force in 2013. The result of
much debate was a compromise that continues the principle of free entrepreneurship and
market initiative, but combines it with the instruments of Regulation 1370/2007 enabling
competent authorities to ensure adequate transport services. The definition of market-
initiated services had to be adjusted to comply with Regulation 1370/2007 and is much
narrower now. Market-initiated services still have legal priority over authority-initiated
services. As public transport in Germany depends on average heavily on public funding it
was expected that market-initiated services would not play a major role under the new
framework, especially not in the expensive urban public transport traditionally operated by
municipal companies. Several market initiatives that occurred nonetheless in 2015 and after
took the industry therefore by surprise. In the case of Pforzheim the market initiative was
successful and replaced the authority’s intention to tender a public service contract.
The Pforzheim case led mainly to local protests first. Fears of the public sector and the trade
unions that Pforzheim would lead to similar cases soon provoked proposals to amend once
more the PBefG in a way that would make a similar development elsewhere unlikely (see
Bundestag-Drucksache 18/11748).
The paper will provide an overview of the German public transport regulation, the definition of
market initiated services and the recent developments concerning such activities. It will
describe the procedure through which commercial operators may gain access to the market
and will provide a closer look at the Pforzheim example. Finally, the paper will give an insight
into the current political debate in which the recent regulatory arrangement is questioned
both by representatives of competent authorities/publicly owned companies and private
operators.
2. National Legislation
The main legal basis of the German local and regional public transport by road2 is the
Personenbeförderungsgesetz (Federal Law on Passenger Transportation, ‘the PBefG’).
Transport of passengers by road vehicles3 requires an authorisation by the authority that
issues the authorisations (‘regulatory authority’). Authorisations are issued either for single
routes or for several routes if they are integrated or economically connected (‘route bundles’).
1 Public transport by road includes in Germany by legal definition bus services, light rail/rapid transit
services, trolleybus services and taxi, car and driver hire as well as coach hire services. It
comprises all ground transportation with the exception of rail transport which is regulated by a
separate law (General Railways Act – Allgemeines Eisenbahngesetz, AEG).
2 For the purpose of the paper ‘local public transport’ is used henceforth.
3 Including tram and rapid transit vehicles; see footnote 1.
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The authorisations are granted for a maximum of ten years in the case of bus services and
up to 15 years for tram or rapid transit services.
In contrast to the now deregulated long distance bus services (Augustin et al. 2014) special
rules apply for the local public transport which will be explained in the following sections 2.1
to 2.5.
2.1 Market access
The PBefG distinguishes for the local public transport two different regimes of market
access. Which regime applies depends on the question whether the service is operated on
the basis of a public service contract (‘non-commercial service’) or not (‘market-initiated
service’), see Figure 1. A market-initiated service is a ‘commercial service’ (further details
section 2.2) which requires only an authorisation for the market access. The operator of a
non-commercial service must have been awarded, either competitively or directly, a public
service contract and in addition needs an authorisation as well.
Figure 1. Market access regimes for commercial and non-commercial services (Source: Own)
The procedure for resolving a possible conflict between a market-initiated and a non-
commercial service is described in section 2.5.
2.2 Authorisation prevents competition in the market
Generally, only one authorisation is granted per route. Competing or parallel services are not
allowed. It is (theoretically) possible that the regulatory authority issues more than one
authorisation, but that would require that the public interest is not harmed. The PBefG
emphasises the public interest as follows (paraphrasing Paragraph 13(2) No 3):
a) it is in the public interest that existing transport services meet the demand adequately
– a gap of supply should be closed
Commercial Services in Germany
Page 4 of 13
b) it is not in the public interest when a new service does not improve materially the
transport services already offered by the incumbent operators and rail undertakings
(there is no gap of supply)
c) if incumbent operators and rail undertakings are willing to modify their services within
a period set by the regulatory authority, an additional service is not necessary (gap of
supply exists, but it is closed by an incumbent operator)
d) a new service must not aim at single profitable routes or a sub-network which belong
to an existing network or route bundle
Any violation of the public interest results in a rejection of the application for a competing
parallel service. Recent examples for parallel services are very rare, if not unheard-of.
It is rather obvious that the authorisation protects the holder from competition and grants
thereby in practice, if not exactly in theory, an exclusive operating right (see for instance
European Commission 2014: 7). Compatibility with Regulation 1370/2007, which requires the
conclusion of a public service contract for granting an exclusive right, is at least doubtful. The
federal government and the Ministry of Transport (see for instance Bundestag-Drucksache
18/11160, p. 8) argue that the legal grounds for the refusal of parallel authorisations do not
match the definition of an exclusive right as laid down in Regulation 1370/2007.4 The
protective effects of the authorisation are in their opinion below the level of an exclusive right.
It is further argued that, even if one assumed that the authorisation is to be characterised as
an exclusive right, the authorising procedure itself would already comply in principle with the
conditions stated in Article 5(3) Regulation 1370/2007 for the award of an exclusive right
(open to all operators, fair, transparent and non-discriminatory).5 Commentators question
nonetheless the legitimacy to grant holders of authorisations a position which in effect equals
an exclusive right (Saxinger 2013: 8 ff.). So far, national jurisdiction confirmed the regulatory
concept from the national legal perspective; the concerned law suits gave no occasion for the
courts to question the compatibility of the concept with the European law. Several court
rulings exist that declare the authorisation to be an exclusive right. This remained without
consequences as the rulings either referred to the legal position before the latest amendment
of the PBefG or are still under appeal.6 A ruling by the highest judicial authority is still
pending.
It follows that in Germany a commercially operated local public transport service cannot be
compared fully with a commercial service provided in a market with open access.
4 Article 2(f): ‘“exclusive right” means a right entitling a public service operator to operate certain
public passenger transport services on a particular route or network or in a particular area, to the
exclusion of any other such operator’
5 It should however be mentioned that several of the formal requirements of Regulation 1370/2007
are not targeted by the authorisation procedure: There is for instance no specific publication
pursuant to Art. 7(2) Regulation 1370/2007, and no formal ‘notification of tender’ implicitly
preconditioned by Art. 5(3) Regulation 1370/2007. Apart from that, the regulatory authority, which
issues the authorisations, is not equivalent to the competent authority; only the latter is addressed
by the competences of Regulation 1370/2007.
6 Verwaltungsgericht Augsburg (Administrative Court of Augsburg), Judgement of 24 March 2015,
Au 3 K 13.2063 + Au 3 K 14.34
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2.3 Definition of market-initiated services and authorisation procedure
Market-initiated services were formerly defined very broadly: They could include any amount
of public subsidy prior to the amendment of the PBefG in 2013, with the consequence that
the majority of the routes were not subject to an award procedure despite the public funding
(for more detail see Karl 2013). After the long-overdue amendment of the PBefG market-
initiated services are now defined as services that cover their costs exclusively with fare
revenue, other commercial revenue, and compensation for complying with maximum tariffs
established by general rules according to Article 3(2) or (3) Regulation 1370/2007 (first
sentence of Paragraph 8(4) PBefG). As compensation on the basis of general rules go along
with a market-initiated service general rules gained high prominence after 2013 (see section
2.4).
Market access of a commercial service can occur in two different constellations:
a) ‘independent’ market-initiated service – the competent authority has no intention to
award a PSC
b) market-initiated service competes the competent authority’s intention to award PSC
In addition, competing market initiatives are in both constellations possible.
An operator interested in a commercial service must apply for an authorisation. The PBefG
sets different time limits for the constellations (see Figure 2): In the situation described
under a), the application must be submitted twelve months before the start of operation; for
situation b), the application must be submitted within a period of three months after the
competent authority publishes its intention to award a contract. A closer look will be taken on
the latter constellation in section 2.5.
Figure 2. Comparison of the time limits for the application for authorisation (Source: Own)
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If more than one operator requests an authorisation for the same route/route bundle the
regulatory authority has to decide which one of the applications offers the best service
(Paragraph 13(2b) PBefG). If the incumbent operator is among the applicants, and has been
so far providing services in accordance with the public interest, the regulatory authority must
consider this application appropriately (Paragraph 13(3) PBefG). This principle provides the
incumbent operator with a certain advantage – an advantage unknown either to the
European procurement law or to the procurement rules of Regulation 1370/2007.
2.4 Significance of general rules
As mentioned in the previous section 2.3, the costs of market-initiated services can be
covered with compensation for complying with maximum tariffs (concessionary fare
compensation). Regulation 1370/2007 allows competent authorities to establish mandatory
maximum tariffs via general rules according to Article 3(2). In addition to that, Member States
may exclude from the scope of Regulation 1370/2007 general rules on financial
compensation for fulfilling maximum tariffs for certain groups of persons, Article 3(3)
Regulation 1370/2007.
General rules play an important role for the possible scope of market-initiated services in
Germany. Traditionally, reduced fares are offered for pupils, students and apprentices and
were compensated according to federal law (Paragraph 45a PBefG in conjunction with
further federal and state norms). In addition to that, fare levels are generally settled for a
region where an integrated public transport organisation exists (‘Verkehrsverbund’). Since
the entry into force of Regulation 1370/2007 compensation for complying with integrated
fares was more and more converted to general rules.7
As compensation granted on the basis of general rules makes the operation of a market-
initiated service more likely general rules may ‘stabilise’ the position of incumbent operators.
The authorisation procedure is much less formalised than a tendering procedure and for
certain constellations goes along with the legal advantage that is given to the application of
the incumbent operator (see previous section 2.3). It is therefore an important strategy of
private operators to emphasise general rules as an alternative to otherwise necessary tender
procedures that require after all significant resources of the competent authority (capacity,
know-how, preparation, etc.). Compensation granted via general rules is in the German
practice, in some cases, very generous.8
The states gained the right to organise compensation for reduced fares for pupils, students
and apprentices by themselves in 2007. The states follow different approaches with regard to
leaving the decision to set up general rules to the (local) competent authorities, see the
overview given in Figure 3.
7 Whether or not these general rules comply with all requirements of Regulation 1370/2007 is not
focus of this paper. Noteworthy is the trend in several regions to grant the incumbent operators the
same amount of money as was paid before, but then on a completely different legal basis, through
new agreements declared to be ‘general rules’.
8 See footnote 7.
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Figure 3. German states’ different approaches to the application of general rules (simplified) (Source:
Own)
It did not take long after the entry into force of the amended PBefG before the first action was
brought before a court of law to enforce an alleged obligation of the competent authority to
set up a general rule when compliance with integrated or maximum tariffs is made
mandatory. The plaintiffs conclude that such an obligation must exist from the priority that is
given to market-initiated services over non-commercial services by the PBefG. Up until now,
all lower and higher courts concerned with such cases ruled against the alleged obligation.9
The courts argue that Regulation 1370/2007 leaves the decision whether to use a PSC or a
general rule up to the competent authority, and neither the prioritisation of market-initiated
services by the PBefG nor other national legislation restricts that freedom. Some of the
judgements have been appealed against and are pending before a higher court or before the
Federal Administrative Court.
2.5 Decision between the different market access regimes
The PBefG provides a rather complex procedure to ensure the priority of market initiatives on
the one hand and to guarantee on the other hand that competent authorities can establish
public transport services which fulfil the requirements in the general interest. In a nutshell the
procedure works as follows:
1. The competent authorities are required to define the necessary level and terms of
public transport services in so called local public transport plans. The local public
transport plan is a framework plan that must describe the required scope and quality
9 For instance: Verwaltungsgericht Münster (Administrative Court of Münster), Judgement of 24.
October 2014, 10 K 2076/12; Oberverwaltungsgericht Nordrhein-Westfalen (Higher Administrative
Court of North Rhine-Westphalia, Judgement of 25. August 2016, 13 A 788/15; Verwaltungsgericht
Schleswig-Holstein (Administrative Court Schleswig-Holstein), Judgement of 22. November 2016,
3 A 351/15.
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of the necessary transport supply, its environmental quality, the required level of
integration of the different means of transport, and accessibility standards. Certain
interest groups and the local transport operators have to be consulted.
2. If the competent authority considers it necessary that public service obligations have
to be established to ensure the provision of the required level of services and fares,
as outlined in the local transport plan, the authority has to publish its inclination to
award a PSC. This publication has to specify the main public service obligations the
authority intends to impose on the future public transport operator. The publication
may refer to specifications of the local public transport plan. The authority has to
publish the information at the very minimum a year before the release of the invitation
to tender procedure or, respectively, before the direct award, but not earlier than 27
months before the planned start of operation. The PBefG makes use of the
publication required by Article 7(2) of Regulation 1370/2007 (‘prior information
notice’), enhancing the mandatory information accordingly.10
3. The announcement of the intention to award a PSC starts a period of three months
for applications to operate the service commercially (‘market initiative’). Interested
transport operators have to submit their application for the authorisation to the
regulatory authority.
4. If applications are submitted the regulatory authority has to decide whether to
approve or reject the application. The published requirements of the competent
authority are the binding benchmark for this decision. The essential requirements
published by the competent authority have to be met by the application for the
authorisation; an exception is only possible if the competent authority accepts the
deviation(s). If there are any doubts about the economic viability of the application,
which must be given for the whole authorisation period, the regulatory authority can
demand further supporting information of the applicant. Aside from these basic
principles the PBefG stipulates additional rules for specified circumstances, but a
further discussion would take us beyond the scope of this paper.
Two additional rules ensure that neither the competent authority nor the operators undermine
the procedure: The competent authority (for instance in the case of an intended award to an
internal operator) could be tempted to request very high standards which without any doubt
no commercial operator could fulfil, but which neither could be seriously afforded by the
competent authority. Therefore, if the competent authority deviates in the tender or direct
award from the standards published beforehand, the time limit for the application of
commercial operators (see point 3 above) is withdrawn – competing applications for the
authorisation are once again allowed. On the other hand, an interested operator could be
tempted to promise to fulfil all requirements of the competent authority without any intention
or capability to actually do so at all or in the long term over the authorisation period. To deter
operators from such strategies the PBefG stipulates that it is not possible for operators to
10 The preparation of the information about the intended PSC required by PBefG can be very time
consuming. Especially in the first years after the amendment of the PBefG competent authorities
sometimes, due to time problems, decided to ‘split’ the prior information notice into the notice
required by Regulation 1370/2007 and a later notice according to the requirements of the PBefG.
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withdraw from the service standards which were required by the competent authority and
which the operator confirmed with the application for authorisation to fulfil.
3. Amended legal framework in practice – unexpected commercial initiatives
Almost all relevant actors did initially approve the amended legal framework of 2013. A much
higher degree of legal certainty, the implementation of direct award options for publicly
owned operators on the one hand and for private operators on the other hand, a clear
procedure that ensures that competent authorities are able to realise a public transport level
in the general interest, were, amongst others, seen as evident improvements.
Surprisingly, the much clearer rules allowed for competitive market initiatives in
constellations where incumbent operators did not expect them at all. The most prominent
example is the case of Pforzheim mentioned in the introduction (section 1), but other
examples became public around the same time or followed. Figure 4 gives an overview of
the most notable commercial initiatives. With the exception of Kiel, all examples took place in
states with concessionary fare compensation schemes either by federal state law or by state
law (see section 2.4).11
Figure 4. Examples of market initiatives that competed against an intended PSC award by the competent
authority (urban networks) (Source: Own)
3.1 Pforzheim case
What happened in Pforzheim? Pforzheim, a city with approximately 120,000 inhabitants, is
located in the state of Baden-Württemberg. Pforzheim’s bus network of about 20 routes
amounts to approximately 4 million kilometres p.a. The competent authority announced its
11 Note: Lower Saxony, with commercial initiatives in Oldenburg and Hildesheim, belonged to that
category until 2016.
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intention to tender the bus network in September 2014 (prior information notice). A second
notice12 followed in May 2015, providing in additional documents the specifications of the
intended PSC according to PBefG-requirements described in section 2.5. The tender was
planned as a competitive award combined with a sale of shares (share deal) of the municipal
bus company SVP (Stadtverkehr Pforzheim GmbH & Co. KG).13 The service level specified
in the notice was below the service in operation at that time because of severe budget
restrictions of the city. The annual compensation for the services prior to the intended tender
amounted to over 4.5 million Euros. A possible commercial operation was considered, not
least for that reason, as highly improbable.
The second notice started the three month period for applications for operating the intended
services commercially. This was more or less seen as a mere formal act. But, within the
three month period a daughter company of Deutsche Bahn, RVS (Regionalbusverkehr
Südwest GmbH), applied for the authorisation to operate the services commercially.14
The application alone, before any positive or negative decision of the regulatory authority,
became immediately a highly controversial political issue. The involved parties, the personnel
of the competent authority, their consultants, the regulatory authority, RVS and its mother
company Deutsche Bahn, were under pressure. SVP’s staff reacted with strikes. Consensus
amongst experts was that the commercial initiative could not have been foreseen. Market
initiatives of a similar dimension were not known until then. Understandably, views of the
public opinion and of the worried employees of SVP differed.
The most outstanding characteristic of RVS’s commercial initiative was the fact that the
application for authorisation did not only meet the standards specified by the city in the prior
information notice. It did even guarantee a higher level of services – and that, to emphasise
the point, without any contractual payments, saving the city of Pforzheim a total of several
millions of Euros.
The regulatory authority, due to a legal obligation,15 had to examine the long-term economic
viability of the application profoundly. It came to the conclusion that the calculation was
robust enough. In January 2016, the regulatory authority decided to approve RVS’s
application, which of course did not improve the situation.
The competent authority considered to file a suit against the regulatory authority’s decision
as it meant that the municipal operator would have to be shut down if the decision held. In
the end, the competent authority did not go to court as the chances to win the case were
estimated to be quite low. A time consuming pending case could have driven SVP into
insolvency as it was highly probable that RVS, and not SVP, would have been granted
temporary authorisations to operate the bus services during the court procedure.
12 See footnote 10.
13 Quite often, the Pforzheim case is now incorrectly represented as an intended direct award to an
internal operator; see for instance Landtag Nordrhein-Westfalen Drucksache 16/13534, p. 1.
14 A second application was filed after the three month period and was later rejected as inadmissible
for failure to meet the deadline.
15 Federal Administrative Court of Germany, Judgement of 24. October 2013, 3 C 26.12
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The date of RVS’s takeover of the bus operation in Pforzheim was 11. December 2016. After
the decision of the regulatory authority the union initiated unannounced strikes of SVP‘s
personnel that went on for months. SVP could only provide a skeleton service. RVS helped
out with a growing number of replacement services. The strike led to massive losses of
revenue not only for the city’s services but also for neighbouring operators because of the
integration of the services. The city decided therefore in June 2017 to sue the union for the
damages incurred as, in the city’s view, the strike lacked a legal basis. Other legal suits are
pending (labour court cases). RVS re-employed 65 of the SVP’s former 200 employees.16
In December 2016 RVS started operations of the regular service. So far, RVS provides the
services according to the required and guaranteed quality and level, and the passengers
seem to be satisfied with the new bus service.
The city and RVS agreed to a procedure for their collaboration.
3.2 Other commercial initiatives
Pforzheim is, so far, the only case where a commercial operator successfully competed
against an intended tender of an urban bus network. Other successful initiatives occurred
with tenders of regional services, but, such cases were anyway not thought improbable.
Figure 4 in Section 3 shows further commercial initiatives concerning urban networks. In most
of these cases the commercial applications were rejected as the standards specified by the
respective competent authority were not met (Oldenburg; Saarlouis; Esslingen; Gotha;
Leverkusen). In some cases the commercial application was later withdrawn (Hamm). Some
of the cases are still pending (Kiel).
Noteworthy is the case of Hildesheim: The constellation in Hildesheim was a bit similar to
Pforzheim: a daughter company of Deutsche Bahn submitted an application for authorisation
within in the three month period after the publication of the specifications of intended PSC.
The city of Hildesheim (ca. 100,000 inhabitants) planned a direct award to SVHI
(Stadtverkehr Hildesheim, municipal operator). The competing application of Deutsche Bahn
led in this case to negotiations between the city and SVHI to agree to a lower wage level,
thereby enabling SVHI to submit an own commercial application. The union and SVHI‘s
personnel finally accepted the cuts. SVHI‘s personnel receives social settlement payments
(difference between old and new wage and social security level) which is financed via cross-
subsidisation by municipal holding companies (“Querverbund”).17
The regulatory authority granted SVHI the authorisation with the argument that it contained
the better service and rejected accordingly the application of the Deutsche Bahn subsidiary.
Deutsche Bahn decided not to challenge the decision: A legal dispute takes up up to three or
four years – regardless of the outcome of the case, such a long period would have
undermined the original business case in any case.
16 RVS’s wage level (private sector wage agreement) is lower than the wage level of SVP (public
sector wage agreement); accusations of wage dumping are unsubstantiated.
17 Whether or not such payments are in accordance with European state aid law or competition law is
an open question.
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4. Conclusions
The Pforzheim case, and the other related cases, led to numerous political initiatives of
public sector and union representatives to amend the PBefG in a way that makes takeovers
of the bus networks of public operators by private operators unlikely. The subsequent draft
bill was not successful for the time being, but it indicates strongly that the compromise
reached by the previous amendment of the PBefG was seriously harmed by the development
in Pforzheim and in other cities: For the public sector, the vital part of the compromise was
the prospect of a continuation of municipal companies via direct awards to internal operators
which is now, as it turned out that a commercial initiative might successfully compete,
undermined.
Private operators defend their actions and point out that the legal arrangement allows for
competing initiatives that, if they are successful, actually relieve the authorities of a heavy
financial burden while at the same time the provision of adequate services is secured by the
legal procedure. Private operators feel themselves under pressure as many municipalities
opt for a direct award to an internal operator. One of the legal preconditions of such a direct
award is that the internal operator is required to perform the major part of the public
passenger transport service itself (Article 5(2)(e) Regulation 1370/2007). This results
sometimes in lower quotas of subcontracts with private operators. Business opportunities for
private operators seem therefore to stagnate or even to shrink.
An outsider might certainly, and rightly so, wonder what all the agitation is about, as
Pforzheim will now save for a period of ten years several millions of Euros, which would
otherwise have been spent as contractual payments for a service level below the successful
market initiative. The answer to this question is manifold. An important piece is the former, de
facto non-competitive, regulation of the German public transport which led to a very stable
and widely unchallenged market demarcation between public and private operators (for
further details see Karl 2013), and which is now acutely threatened.
The paper took the Pforzheim case as an occasion for a closer look at the current legal
arrangement, which continues the peculiar protection of holders of an authorisation from
competition, and at newly emerged strategies of preserving previous arrangements of
financial support ‘under the cover’ of a general rule. These peculiarities alone – and there are
many more – hint at the thin ice on which the current German regulatory arrangement of the
public transport by road rests.
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